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WHEN INDIVIDUALS SEEK DEATH AT 
THE HANDS OF THE POLICE: THE 
LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
OF SUICIDE BY COP AND WHY 
POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD USE 
NONLETHAL FORCE IN DEALING 
WITH SUICIDAL SUSPECTS 
RAHI AZIZI* 
INTRODUCTION 
Occasionally, Joel Schumacher’s 1993 film Falling Down, starring 
Michael Douglas and Robert Duvall, serves as a topic of discussion in 
academic papers.1  In Falling Down, Douglas plays Bill Foster, a 
psychotic engineer fired from his position at a missile defense company.  
A traffic jam on a scorching day in Los Angeles serves as the triggering 
event in the storyline.  Ostracized from work and delirious from heat, 
*J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.  Many thanks to Bailey Bifoss and 
the staff of the Golden Gate Law Review for all of their hard work on this piece. 
 1 See Rebecca Johnson & Ruth Buchanan, Getting the Insider’s Story Out: What Popular 
Film Can Tell Us About Legal Method’s Dirty Secrets, 20 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 87, 100-
103 (2001) (discussing the film Falling Down as an example of the perceptual powers of cinema); 
see also Christine Alice Corcos, “Who Ya Gonna C(s)ite?” Ghostbusters and the Environmental 
Regulation Debate, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 231, 271 n.180 (1997) (discussing Falling Down as 
an example of a movie with a frustrated protagonist who takes the law into his own hands). 
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Foster leaves his car in the middle of the freeway and journeys by foot to 
Venice Beach, where he hopes to reunite with his estranged wife and 
daughter.  En route, he engages in violent confrontations with several 
individuals, including a Korean storeowner, three Mexican gang 
members, and a militant skinhead. 
Duvall’s character, a homicide detective, tracks Foster down and 
corners him at a pier in Venice.  Even though he discarded his gun earlier 
that day, Foster suggests that they have a shoot out.  He reaches into his 
pocket and pretends to retrieve a weapon.  The detective instinctively 
shoots him.  Before he falls over the pier, Foster pulls out a squirt gun he 
had obtained earlier from his daughter’s room.  The audience realizes 
that Foster wanted to die.  By goading the officer into killing him, Foster 
enabled his wife to collect the proceeds of his life insurance policy and 
raise their daughter securely. 
Foster’s death constitutes a recognized category of police killings: 
suicide by cop.2  The term “suicide by cop” (alternatively, “police-
assisted suicide”3) is controversial and ill-defined.  Academics have 
explored the psychological and narratological implications of suicide by 
cop to some extent.  We know that suicidal individuals sometimes enlist 
the help of others in killing themselves as a way to overcome the moral 
prohibition against committing suicide.4  And, as exemplified in Falling 
Down, directors and writers sometimes use suicide by cop as a narrative 
device in portraying the demise of a protagonist who is either a 
sympathetic vigilante or an antihero.5  However, our legal literature has 
not thoroughly examined how classifying a police killing as suicide by 
cop might shape legal complaints against law enforcement agencies.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that police officers can use deadly 
force against a suspect only if he or she employs deadly force against an 
officer or a bystander.7  The standard to determine whether an officer’s 
 2 Alan Feuer, Drawing a Bead on a Baffling Endgame: Suicide by Cop, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 1998, at 4. 
 3 See Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000) (stating that the term 
“suicide by cop” is interchangeable with “police assisted suicide”). 
 4 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9 (2004). 
 5 For example, in S.E. Hinton’s coming-of-age novel about 1960s greasers, The Outsiders, 
one of the main characters of the book commits suicide by cop.  S.E. HINTON, THE OUTSIDERS 
(1967). 
 6 The exception is Flynn and Homant’s work.  See Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, 
“Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
555 (2000). 
 7 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). 
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use of force is excessive is one of “objective reasonableness”: whether it 
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to 
believe that the suspect meant to kill or seriously harm others.8  Evidence 
that the suspect threatened to harm the officer or civilians is helpful in 
making this determination.9  Sometimes the police realize after the 
shooting that despite his or her actions, the suspect did not intend to harm 
anyone.10  The suspect may have threatened to shoot a bystander to 
facilitate the commission of a robbery or to escape the scene of a 
nonviolent crime.  Yet the suspect’s intent does not factor into a 
determination of whether the officer’s use of lethal force was lawful.11  
As long as it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude—
precisely at the moment that he or she fired the shot—that the suspect 
was about to use lethal force, the officer’s use of deadly force is 
excusable.12 
This Article serves two purposes: 1) to determine whether suicide 
by cop can form the basis for a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, part of 
the 1871 Civil Rights Act13 the main federal statute through which 
private litigants can bring civil rights suits against police departments 
and 2) to analyze the policy implications of recognizing suicide by cop as 
a unique category of police killings.  This Article will also determine 
whether a suicide-by-cop killing inclines courts to apply something other 
than the “objectively reasonable” standard in adjudicating a § 1983 
claim.14  Furthermore, it will try to determine whether evidence of the 
 8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-98 (1989). 
 9 However, as this Article will further explore, the suspect’s intent to commit suicide does 
not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, given the difficult decisions 
officers must make when confronting potentially dangerous suspects.  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397-
98 (stating that the calculus of reasonableness must “embody allowance for the fact that officers are 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation”). 
 10 See Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other 
grounds in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).  In that case, a suicidal suspect cut himself with a 
knife before the police arrived, indicating that he probably meant only to harm himself.  Also, 
evidence in that case suggested that he did not intentionally provoke the officers.  Rather, he 
inadvertently fell off the dresser drawer, whereupon the officers thought he was about to attack them 
and so shot him to death. 
 11 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (holding that the “reasonableness” of an officer’s actions 
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight). 
 12 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12 (holding that an officer must reasonably believe that a 
suspect poses a deadly threat before he can deploy lethal force against the suspect). 
 13 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2011). 
 14 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 (holding that the appropriate standard for deciding § 1983 
suits is whether an objectively reasonable officer would have used that degree of force under the 
circumstances). 
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suspect’s suicidal intentions can either improve or mitigate the plaintiff’s 
chances of prevailing in court.15 
Additionally, this Article makes two principal arguments.  First, 
because suicide by cop can often result in litigation, police departments 
should train officers to better ascertain when a suspect may be attempting 
suicide by cop.16  While many courts bar the admission of “pre-seizure” 
evidence (evidence that came into being before the suspect’s interaction 
with officers, like a suicide note17) in § 1983 suits, some courts have 
shown a willingness to admit evidence that the suspect was attempting 
suicide.18  Therefore, police departments face a tangible threat of 
litigation stemming from suicide-by-cop incidents.19  At least one federal 
appellate case, Palmquist v. Selvik, suggests that evidence of suicide by 
cop may be pertinent in determining whether police tactics are 
appropriate under § 1983.20 
Second, because suicide by cop poses a significant sociological 
problem,21 we should encourage police officers to employ nonlethal 
force in defusing an attempt at suicide by cop where the risk of harm to 
others is minimal.22  Victims of suicide by cop often share certain traits: 
they are usually poor, mentally ill, and addicted to alcohol or narcotics.23  
Law enforcement agencies must educate officers of the underlying 
circumstances that can contribute to suicide by cop.24  Suicide-by-cop 
 15 In Garner, the Supreme Court held that the trier of fact must determine whether an 
officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable according to the totality of circumstances at the 
time of the shooting. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-10.  The question this Article confronts is whether a 
suspect’s suicidal motives or actions constitute a circumstance that the trier of fact may consider. 
 16 Many police departments provide some general training on suicide intervention.  See 
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of 
Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 574 (2000). 
 17 See, e.g., Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “pre-seizure 
conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny”). 
 18 See, e.g., Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1342 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence 
that a suspect intends to commit suicide by police is “directly relevant to his life expectancy” and 
therefore likely admissible).  This Article will closely examine the Palmquist opinion in later 
sections. 
 19 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 558 (2000). 
 20 Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1340-42. 
 21 See Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller III, Suicide by Cop: 
Defining a Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 19-20 (2005), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-
pdfs/feb05leb.pdf (characterizing suicide-by-cop incidents as “painful and damaging experiences for 
surviving families, the communities, and all law enforcement professionals”). 
 22 Id. at 11. 
 23 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 87 (2004). 
 24 Flynn and Homant have pointed out that until fairly recently, very few police departments 
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incidents may worsen police-community relations because residents 
might think that the police shooting was unnecessary, unjustified, or even 
racially motivated.25  Therefore, police officers should minimize the 
occurrences of suicide by cop by using deadly force only when 
absolutely necessary. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND PREVALENCE OF SUICIDE BY COP 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE TERM “SUICIDE BY COP” 
Forensic medical journals coined the term “suicide by cop.”26  Prior 
to the 1990s, the term was not widely known, but today law enforcement 
agencies and media commentators frequently use it.27  However, there is 
no commonly accepted definition of suicide by cop, which considerably 
complicates its consideration in § 1983 lawsuits.28 
Some consider the classification a misnomer.29  One commentator 
suggests that suicide by cop is “far more often a post hoc justification of 
sloppy police work than a valid explanation of why and how someone 
died.”30  Another characterizes it as a “catchy descriptor for a far larger 
number of cases in which officers put themselves unnecessarily into 
harm’s way” and must “shoot their way out.”31  From this perspective, 
the classification tends to insulate police officers from blame even when 
their actions were unreasonable.32  The word “suicide” suggests that the 
dealt specifically with “suicide-by-police” scenarios. Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, 
“Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
555, 574 (2000). 
 25 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 99 (2004). 
 26 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000). 
 27 Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a 
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See James J. Fyfe, Policing the Emotionally Disturbed, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
345, 346 (2000) (arguing that suicide by cop is an inadequate explanation of why and how someone 
dies). 
 30 See id. 
 31 Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of 
Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed 
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 297 n.173 (2003) (internal citation omitted). 
 32 See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality 
of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed 
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 298 (2003) (suggesting that because plaintiffs in police 
5
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suspect was to blame for his or her own death; the officer was merely an 
unwitting instrument in effectuating the suspect’s suicidal desires.33  
According to proponents of this view, suicide by cop is nothing more 
than an attempt to shift blame “from police to victim.”34 
Others have defined suicide by cop as a situation in which “a 
suicidal, distraught and often unbalanced individual comes into contact 
with law enforcement officers,” and through life-threatening actions 
“causes the police to retaliate in self-defense or defense of others by 
killing the person.”35  The best example emerges when a suspect 
deliberately points an unloaded gun at a police officer in order to 
provoke a violent response.36  The suspect’s intent becomes probative; if 
the offender intends to kill the officer or threatens him or her with deadly 
force in order to escape, labeling the incident as suicide by cop proves 
misleading.37  It erroneously portrays a potential murderer as a victim of 
police brutality. 
B. THE PREVALENCE OF SUICIDE BY COP 
Studies that explore the frequency of suicide by cop emerged in the 
early 1990s,38 after a California newspaper acknowledged that suicide by 
cop was a growing problem among lower-income males in San Diego.39  
Unfortunately, complete, nationwide statistics on suicide by cop are 
unavailable.40  The Uniform Crime Reporting program indicates that 
between 1991 and 2000, sixty-two offenders who feloniously killed a 
 
misconduct cases often challenge the way in which officers were trained, police training on suicidal 
suspects may be relevant to a plaintiff’s claim). 
 33 Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino 
Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1103 n.134 (2001). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 555 (2000). 
 36 Some might characterize such a situation as suicide by cop even if the gun was loaded. 
See, e.g., James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth 
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 137 (2000).  What ultimately matters with regard to the 
classification is the suspect’s intent. 
 37 James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth 
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 137 (2000). 
 38 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000).  
 39 Clark Brooks, Suicide by Cop; Officers Sometimes Find Themselves Pawns in an 
Individual’s Death Wish, San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 26, 1991, at C1. 
 40 Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a 
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 9 (2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf. 
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law enforcement officer committed suicide during the same incident.41  
The study fails, however, to identify the number of suspects who 
intentionally goaded officers into shooting them during that time 
period.42 
In compiling statistics, law enforcement and social service agencies 
usually consider incidents in which suspects genuinely attempted to harm 
or kill police officers.43  Neglecting to consider these situations might be 
unfair to police officers, as the use of lethal force against a suspect who 
is attempting suicide is justified when the suspect poses a concomitant 
danger to either the officer or public safety.44  Moreover, a suspect who 
intends to harm officers or others can still possess the requisite intent to 
commit suicide by cop. 
Merely identifying the number of individuals who commit suicide 
by cop does not adequately address the problem.  Rather, studies should 
identify the characteristics that perpetrators share, so that police officers 
can more readily determine whether a suspect exhibits those 
characteristics.  A study conducted by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department does precisely that.  The study indicates that roughly 10% of 
officer-involved shootings end in suicide by cop.45  According to this 
study, 65% of offenders who commit suicide by cop convey their 
suicidal intent to others,46 43% exhibit signs of suicidal behavior and 
22% leave suicide notes.47  An alarming 59% ask the police to kill them 
and 15% continue to point a gun at the police after being warned that 
they would be shot.48  Finally, the study found that 16% of those who 
commit suicide by cop were not armed with a gun, but were trying to 
harm the officer with a knife.49 
For the most part, studies about suicide by cop are scarce and 
 41 Id. at 10; see also Alan Feuer, Drawing a Bead on a Baffling Endgame: Suicide by Cop, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, at 4. 
 42 Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a 
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf. 
 43 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000).  
 44 Id. at 570 n.116. 
 45 Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a 
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf.  
The study was based on suicide-by-cop incidents that occurred during a ten-year period, from 1987 
to 1997. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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inadequate.50  The foregoing studies are limited because they do not 
indicate whether a given suicidal suspect threatened officers with a 
nonlethal instrument, nor do they indicate whether the officers were 
aware that the suspect was suicidal.  Without more comprehensive data 
on suicide by cop, law enforcement agencies may not be able to assess 
the ways in which suicide-by-cop incidents strain relations between 
police departments and members of the communities they serve.51 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE: ASSESSING 
 THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
 SUICIDE BY COP 
A. THE LINK BETWEEN HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE 
A relationship exists between self-destructive and homicidal 
impulses.52  For instance, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the teenage 
perpetrators of the Columbine Massacre, killed themselves shortly after 
murdering 18 classmates in their high school cafeteria on April 20, 
1999.53  Kip Kinkel, a 15-year-old who went on a shooting spree in 
Springfield, Oregon, screamed “Kill me! Kill me!” after being wrestled 
to the ground by onlookers.54  Often, acts of self-destruction and the 
destruction of others share similar psychological roots: the sense that life 
is intolerable and that death is the only true escape.55  Consequently, 
homicide sometimes functions as a masked suicide attempt, especially 
when the suspect is certain his or her actions will trigger a lethal police 
response.56  A suicidal suspect who threatens others with violence may 
rather die than face incarceration.57  Thus, the suspect will devise a 
situation in which officers have little choice but to shoot him or her.58 
 50 Id. at 74. 
 51 Id. 
 52 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 13 (2004). 
 53 James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth 
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2000). 
 54 Id. at 137. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. (stating that “in some cases, the act of killing others is intended as a suicide attempt”). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. (suggesting that the suspect may devise such a situation by “taking hostages or pointing 
a loaded gun at a police officer”). 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss2/3
AZIZI (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  1:56:01 PM 
2011] SUICIDE BY COP 191 
 
B.  FACTORS THAT TRIGGER SUICIDE BY COP 
The factors that lead to suicide-by-cop are similar to the factors 
behind other forms of suicide: poverty, unemployment, drug addiction, 
depression, mental illness, and a history of familial dissension.59  For 
example, in one case a suicidal drug addict assailed a police officer 
because he was dissatisfied with his job as a mechanic.60  In another 
case, a suspect who threatened police officers with physical violence 
kept exclaiming that his life “isn’t worth anything” and insisted that the 
officers shoot him.61  Multiple factors like economic hardship coupled 
with substance abuse can drive an individual to commit violent crimes.62  
A single factor by itself is less likely to trigger violence.63  For instance, 
one study revealed that the odds of a male teenager acting violently 
doubled if he abused alcohol or drugs.64  The odds tripled if the teenager 
also had a prior arrest record.65 
Mental instability can also trigger confrontations with officers.66  In 
Wallace v. Davies, a suspect became suicidal after unsuccessfully trying 
to contact his mental health counselor.67  The police promptly arrived at 
the suspect’s apartment and found the suspect in possession of a gun, 
planning to shoot himself.68  An officer, upon seeing the gun, fired once 
at the suspect, fatally wounding him.69 
A similar case, Hainze v. Richards, demonstrates the difficulty that 
police officers face when subduing suicidal suspects who exhibit signs of 
mental illness, like delusions and auditory hallucinations.70  In Hainze, 
the police responded to a call from a woman to transport her suicidal 
nephew to a hospital for mental health treatment.71  The nephew had a 
 59 Id. at 137-38.  
 60 Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 61 Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 62 James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth 
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 138 (2000). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality 
of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed 
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (2003) (stating that nationwide, police 
departments “estimate that an average of approximately seven percent of police calls involve 
mentally ill people”). 
 67 Wallace v. Estate of Davies by Davies, 676 N.E.2d 422, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
 68 Id. at 424-25. 
 69 Id. at 424. 
 70 Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 71 Id. at 798. 
9
Azizi: Suicide By Cop
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011
AZIZI (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  1:56:01 PM 
192 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
ect.  
 
mental illness and was under the influence of alcohol and 
antidepressants.72  The police had been notified he was contemplating 
suicide by cop.73  When officers arrived on the scene he walked toward 
the officers with a knife.74  After he refused an order to stop, the officers 
shot him.75  The suspect survived, but the court addressed the issue of 
whether anything short of lethal force might have disabled the suspect 
without compounding the risk of harm to the officers.76  The Fifth 
Circuit exonerated the officers after commenting on the danger posed to 
public safety by the knife-wielding, intoxicated susp 77
C. BETTER UNDERSTANDING WHY INDIVIDUALS COMMIT SUICIDE BY 
 COP AND WHY THE POLICE SHOULD USE NONLETHAL FORCE IN 
 THE FIRST PLACE 
In order to enable officers to resolve suicide-by-cop incidents 
through nonviolent methods, police departments must provide more 
adequate training concerning the traits shared by suicide-by-cop victims.  
The cases and limited studies we have reflect a general trend: the 
majority of victims of suicide by cop are young and economically 
disadvantaged males, often wrestling with psychosis or substance 
abuse.78  However, unlike other suicidal individuals (e.g., the Columbine 
shooters), they require assistance in accomplishing their own deaths.  
Someone else has to pull the trigger. 
Some commentators argue that distinguishing the homicidal from 
the suicidal does not advance a particular law enforcement aim.79  The 
systemic problems that trigger both suicide and homicide among urban 
youth are almost identical in nature.80  Like persons who are suicidal, 
homicidal individuals are predominantly disadvantaged and have a 
propensity toward substance abuse.81  From this perspective, suicide by 
cop is not really a “police problem” in that it does not substantially differ 
from other forms of suicide.  Accordingly, the term “suicide by cop” is 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 798-99. 
 76 Id. at 798. 
 77 Id. at 800-02 
 78 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 87 (2004). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 50. 
 81 Id. at 49-50. 
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inconsequential.  It should not have any bearing on police work.82  
Instead, these commentators argue that the responsibility should fall on 
social service workers and mental health professionals to facilitate early 
intervention before children are old enough to commit violent crimes. 
The advocates of this view raise significant points.83  A suspect who 
genuinely desires to hurt civilians or police officers is not entitled to 
preferential treatment from law enforcement agents simply because he or 
she is suicidal.84  However, victims of suicide by cop often do not pose a 
threat of violence to others.  They merely wish to end their lives.  No 
community can completely eradicate the factors that lead to suicide, such 
as depression, poverty, and substance abuse.85  Therefore, the burden 
falls on law enforcement agencies to train officers to exercise greater 
restraint when dealing with individuals who appear to be attempting 
suicide by cop.  Otherwise, police officers will continue to serve as 
instruments through which desperate individuals can effectuate their 
suicidal desires. 
III. SUICIDE BY COP IN § 1983 LAWSUITS 
A suspect’s recourse against a police officer who uses excessive 
force is a § 1983 lawsuit.86  Through a § 1983 lawsuit, the plaintiff—
either the suspect, or if the suspect is killed, his or her estate—can allege 
that the officer’s use of excessive force constituted an unreasonable 
“seizure” or arrest that violated his or her Fourth Amendment rights.87  
The standard for determining whether the officer’s use of force was 
excessive is the “objective reasonableness” test, articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor.88  In order to prevail under that 
 82 For example, at least one court has held that failing “merely to instruct police on the 
handling of dangerous people who appear to be irrational cannot amount to deliberate indifference.”  
Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999).  Pena’s holding suggests that even if a 
suspect is suicidal or deranged, the police cannot be deemed negligent in their handling of the 
suspect if he or she posed a danger to others. 
 83 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 577 (2000) (stating that “holding 
police responsible for having someone aim a shotgun at them because they checked a doorknob . . . 
would at best be likely to have a chilling effect on policy intervention into any situation”). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to 
Youth Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 142 (2000) (discussing the socioeconomic issues 
plaguing urban youth). 
 86 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2011). 
 87 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985), (holding that apprehension “by the use of 
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 88 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-398 (1989). 
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test, the plaintiff must show that the use of deadly force was not 
reasonably necessary from the perspective of the objective police officer 
under the apparent circumstances.89 
Tennessee v. Garner governs the propriety of a police officer’s use 
of deadly force.90  The use of deadly force is justified only if the suspect 
poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to the officer or 
civilians.91  In determining whether the officer’s belief that the suspect 
posed an immediate threat of serious harm was objectively reasonable, 
courts will consider “the totality of the circumstances” at the time of the 
shooting.92  As this Article will show, the legal standard remains the 
same where suicide by cop is in play.93  But the question becomes 
whether suicide by cop is an admissible circumstance that factors into a § 
1983 analysis.  In answering that question, it is necessary to examine the 
legislative rationale behind § 1983. 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 1983: AN ATTEMPT TO REMEDY 
 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
The enactment of § 1983 was tied to the Civil War and 
Reconstruction—the period following the assassination of President 
Lincoln when Congress passed a series of laws designed to secure the 
rights of citizenship for emancipated African-Americans.94  Congress 
borrowed much of the language in § 1983 from the Enforcement Act of 
1871.95  That statute, passed during the Reconstruction Period following 
the Civil War, was designed to provide African-Americans with a federal 
civil rights remedy against white supremacist organizations like the Ku 
Klux Klan and the White Brotherhood.96  Federal civil rights legislation 
was necessary because local and state governments refused to protect 
African-Americans from violent racists.97  Moreover, local governments 
 89 See id. at 397 (holding that the inquiry “is an objective one: the question is whether the 
officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”). 
 90 Garner, 471 U.S. 1. 
 91 Id. at 11. 
 92 Id. at 9-10. 
 93 Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1337 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 94 For an overview of civil rights legislation enacted during the Reconstruction, see Douglas 
L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 510-12 (1993). 
 95 See id. at 506 (stating that the Enforcement Act of 1871 “contained in its first section the 
language now found” in § 1983). 
 96 Id. at 513-14. 
 97 Id. at 510-12. 
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often collaborated with racist groups in depriving African-Americans of 
their constitutional rights.98  The ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866 led to a wave of violence against freed blacks 
throughout the former Confederacy.99 
The Enforcement Act, also called the Ku Klux Klan Act, was based 
in part on the earlier 1866 Civil Rights Act.100  That law, together with 
the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteed African-Americans status as 
citizens and empowered the federal government to criminally prosecute 
any local official who deprived a citizen of his or her civil rights while 
acting “under color of law.”101  The Enforcement Act granted the 
President the power to suspend habeas corpus in prosecuting Klan 
members.102  By 1872, hundreds of Klansmen had been arrested.103  
Ultimately, the federal government broke the organizational apparatus of 
the Klan.104  However, during the Reconstruction period, the civil 
provisions of the Enforcement Act,105 which enabled any plaintiff to file 
suit against two or more private individuals who conspired to violate that 
person’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, were not utilized by litigants in 
redressing civil rights violations.106 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, later codified as § 1983, empowered 
citizens to sue local or state officials for civil rights violations.107  Its 
 98 Id. at 514. 
 99 Id. at 514-18. 
 100 Id. at 514 (stating that the drafters of the Enforcement Act modeled its language after the 
1866 Civil Rights Act’s criminal provision). 
 101 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 242 (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting the deprivation of a person’s civil rights under color of 
law); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in 
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 511-12 (1993) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 guaranteed African-Americans the status of citizenship and reinforced the ability of the federal 
government to protect the rights of citizenship). 
 102 See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3, 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (1871) (vesting the 
President with discretion to suspend habeas corpus in order to overthrow a rebellion); see also Mark 
D. Pezold, When to Be a Court of Last Resort: The Search for a Standard of Review for the 
Suspension Clause, 51 B.C. L. REV. 243, 250 (pointing out that after the Civil War, Congress 
authorized President Ulysses S. Grant “to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in 1871 as part of the 
federal government’s efforts to combat the Ku Klux Klan during the Reconstruction era”). 
 103 Richard Wormser, The Enforcement Acts (1870-1871), THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW, 
JIM CROW STORIES, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_enforce.html (last visited Feb. 
7, 2011). 
 104 Id. 
 105 The Enforcement (or Ku Klux Klan) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 106 Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police 
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 514-16 (1993). 
 107 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2011). This statute, which Congress originally enacted as 
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, provides as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
13
Azizi: Suicide By Cop
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011
AZIZI (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  1:56:01 PM 
196 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
purpose, unlike that of the Enforcement Act, was to protect African-
Americans from racist government actors.108  While citizens could sue 
state or municipal governments under the Enforcement Act for violating 
federal statutory or constitutional law, the Act did not vest citizens with a 
separate cause of action.109  But other laws existed that protected the civil 
rights of African-Americans, including the right to vote (protected by the 
Fifteenth Amendment),110 secure property (protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment),111 and live as free individuals (protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment).112  Together with the post-Civil War Amendments, § 1983 
deterred local officials from infringing on these rights.113 
B. THE MODERN USE OF § 1983 AS A MEANS TO BRING EXCESSIVE-
 FORCE CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
 Since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, the nature of § 
1983 litigation has changed.114  Private individuals still rely on § 1983 as 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
 108 Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police 
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 515-16 (1993). 
 109 Id. 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 111 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 112 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 113 See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in 
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 517 (1993) (stating that the purpose of the 
Reconstruction-era constitutional amendments was to “counter the officially condoned and 
perpetrated white ‘reign of terror’ that sought to reverse the legal gains of African-Americans from 
post-War federal policy”). 
 114 After Reconstruction, courts construed federal civil rights statutes quite narrowly in order 
to prevent African-Americans from challenging Jim Crow practices. For example, from 1871 until 
1941, Supreme Court decisions on § 1983 limited the meaning of “under color of law” in cases 
involving state agents other than law enforcement officials. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil 
Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 518 n.93 
(1993).  In Barney v. City of New York, the Court held that unauthorized acts of state construction do 
not constitute state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barney v. City of New 
York, 193 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1904). Moreover, prior to Monroe v. Pape, the Court’s “under color of 
law” had required litigants to establish that the state had authorized an official’s unlawful act under 
state law. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police 
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 (1993). As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Monroe, 
during the “seventy year [sic] which followed [§ 1983’s passage,] . . . the ‘under color’ provisions . . 
. uniformly involved action taken either in strict pursuance of some specific command of state law or 
within the scope of executive discretion in the administration of state laws.”  Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167, 212-13 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), overruled on other grounds 
by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York  436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). This limited 
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a powerful tool against police departments that employ racially 
discriminatory tactics against suspects.115  However, today parties can 
also use § 1983 to sue the police based on allegations of excessive force, 
even in the absence of racial discrimination or racial profiling.116 
The Fourth Amendment provides the legal basis for a complaint 
alleging excessive force by a police officer.117  Courts have held that a 
police officer’s use of excessive force in detaining or subduing a suspect 
constitutes an unlawful “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.118  
Whenever a police officer “accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.”119  The standard for 
determining reasonableness takes into account that police officers must 
sometimes make split-second decisions when confronting deadly 
assailants.120  Consequently, the “reasonableness” of the seizure depends 
not only on when the seizure is made, but also on how it is carried out.121 
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court advanced a more 
interpretation of the “under color” language meant that police officers and other officials were not 
subject to federal jurisdiction for actions that deprived citizens of their constitutional rights. Douglas 
L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 n.92 (1993).  However, Monroe v. Pape, decided in 1961, “revitalized 
Section 1983’s role as a federal civil remedy against individual police officers that deprive citizens 
of their constitutional rights.”  Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: 
Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 (1993).  In Monroe, the 
Supreme Court rejected the narrow definition of the term “under color of law” that had stymied § 
1983 litigation for the preceding ninety years.  Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights 
Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 n.92 (1993).  
Monroe held that plaintiffs could use § 1983 to remedy a constitutional injury inflicted by a police 
officer whose misuse of power by “virtue of state law [was only] made possible . . . because the 
wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United 
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 
 115 Racial profiling claims are usually based on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction . . . .”).  But § 1983 serves as a vehicle for bringing 
these and other constitutional claims.  See generally Jeremiah Wagner, Racial (De)Profiling: 
Modeling a Remedy for Racial Profiling After the School Desegregation Cases, 22 LAW & INEQ. 73, 
82 (2004) (discussing the role of the Equal Protection Clause in racial profiling cases). 
 116 See Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in 
Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 753-57 (1993) (discussing the ways in which § 
1983 has been used to litigate against police departments). 
 117 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding that “apprehension by the use of 
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 118 See id. 7-8 (holding that a seizure is unlawful when it is unreasonable in light of the 
amount of force used in the course of the intrusion and the interest at stake). 
 119 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (internal citation omitted). 
 120 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (holding that “[t]he calculus of 
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make 
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation”). 
 121 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8. 
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specific standard for determining when an officer’s use of deadly force is 
objectively reasonable.122  While an officer is allowed to arrest a person 
if “he has probable cause to believe that person committed a crime,” the 
use of deadly force is permissible only when the suspect poses a threat of 
deadly force to others or the officer herself.123  An officer’s belief that a 
suspect is trying to use deadly force must be reasonable.124  In making 
that determination, courts will balance the “totality of circumstances” 
that existed at the time of the seizure.125  For instance, in Gray-Hopkins 
v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
fatal shooting of an unarmed suspect who was standing still with his 
hands over his head was excessive and unconstitutional because the man 
did not pose any threat to public safety.126 
The test is an objective one; the officer’s motives do not factor into 
a § 1983 analysis concerning the lawfulness of a police seizure.127  
Instead, courts consider only circumstances of which the officer had 
knowledge at the time of the shooting, not after the fact.128  More 
specifically, when suicide by cop is in play, the issue becomes whether 
the police were aware of the suspect’s suicidal motives at the time of the 
shooting.  If the officer was not aware of the suspect’s suicidal motives at 
the time of the shooting, then those motives do not factor into a § 1983 
analysis because Graham proscribes the use of hindsight in determining 
whether a police shooting was reasonable.129 
C. SUICIDE BY COP IN § 1983 LITIGATION AND WHETHER A SUSPECT’S 
 SUICIDAL MOTIVES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN A TOTALITY-OF-
 THE-CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS 
The seminal case on suicide by cop is Palmquist v. Selvik.130  
 122 Id. at 17-22. 
 123 See id. at 2 (holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is not permissible unless 
the officer “has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 
serious physical harm to the officer or others”). 
 124 See id. (holding that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”). 
 125 Id. at 9-10. 
 126 Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 309 F.3d 224, 231 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 127 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-98 (1989) (holding that the question is whether 
the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”). 
 128 See id. at 396 (holding that the reasonableness “of a particular use of force must be judged 
from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight”). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss2/3
AZIZI (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  1:56:01 PM 
2011] SUICIDE BY COP 199 
 
Palmquist addressed the question whether evidence that the suspect was 
attempting suicide by cop is admissible in a § 1983 suit.131  While the 
Seventh Circuit declined to admit evidence of the suspect’s suicidal 
motives on the facts of that case, in dictum it stressed that evidence of 
suicide by cop can be admissible at trial by either party under certain 
circumstances.132  The court applied the Graham standard in determining 
the lawfulness of a police shooting in a suicide-by-cop scenario; 
however, the decision demonstrates that evidence of a suspect’s suicidal 
intentions can both strengthen and undermine the merits of a § 1983 
claim.133 
In Palmquist, Paul Palmquist, a resident of Bensenville, Illinois, 
began screaming obscenities and incoherent statements in his apartment 
and broke his neighbor’s window.134  The police were notified of his 
erratic behavior, and when officers arrived at his apartment they found 
Palmquist wielding a muffler pipe.135  Suffering from hallucinations, he 
thought that the police officers were there to kill him.136  When the 
officers attempted to arrest him for breaking the windows, he swung the 
pipe at one of the officers and landed a blow.137  After Palmquist swung 
the pipe again, another officer fired numerous shots, killing him.138  
Palmquist’s last words were, “You finally gave me what I wanted,” and 
“I hope this worked, I hope you shot me enough.”139 
Palmquist was a Vietnam War veteran who had told friends that he 
wished to be shot by the police because he was depressed with his job as 
a mechanic and the fact that he did not have a girlfriend.140  At the time 
of the incident with the police, he may have been under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, and shouted at the officers that they were Viet Cong 
colonels.141  After his death, Palmquist’s estate filed suit against the city, 
alleging a § 1983 violation for use of excessive force.142  The estate 
argued that Selvik, the sheriff who fatally shot Palmquist eleven times, 
Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 555, 559, 563 (2000) (characterizing Palmquist as the first case on suicide by cop). 
 131 Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1340-42. 
 132 Id. at 1338-42. 
 133 See id. at 1337. 
 134 Id. at 1335. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1336. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 1338. 
 141 Id. at 1336, 1338. 
 142 Id. at 1336. 
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and the other officers had received inadequate training on how to handle 
persons behaving abnormally and used excessive force in seizing 
Palmquist.143  Although the estate did not rely on Palmquist’s suicidal 
motives to support its legal argument, several references were made 
during trial regarding Palmquist’s desire to commit suicide.144  However, 
the magistrate judge crafted a jury instruction stating that any evidence 
of the suspect’s “death wish” was irrelevant to the excessive-force claim, 
since it fell outside the time frame of the shooting (evidence that 
Palmquist wished to kill himself emerged only after Palmquist was 
shot).145  The jury found the city liable and awarded the estate $165,000 
in damages.146 
Selvik and the city appealed the verdict, arguing that the judge had 
improperly excluded evidence concerning Palmquist’s death wish, 
because this evidence was directly relevant to both liability and 
damages.147  The city argued that evidence of Palmquist’s intent to 
commit suicide by cop was relevant to liability, because it tended to 
show that Palmquist was the initial aggressor during his entanglement 
with police officers and that the officers’ lethal response was therefore 
appropriate.148  The city also argued that evidence of suicide by cop was 
admissible under Rule 404(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as an 
exception to the general prohibition against character evidence in 
criminal cases, for the purpose of showing that Palmquist was the “first 
aggressor.”149  The defense sought to show that the officer who shot 
Palmquist acted in self-defense, and that Palmquist was the proximate 
cause of his own death.150  As to the question of damages, the city argued 
that if Palmquist was suicidal, any computation of damages based on his 
life expectancy prior to the shooting should have taken his suicidal 
motives into account.151 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the award with regard to the 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 1341. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1342. 
 147 Id. at 1337. 
 148 Id. at 1338. 
 149 Id. at 1332, 1338; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (prohibiting the admission of evidence 
of a person’s character or a trait of character for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except where “[i]n a criminal case . . . the prosecution [offers] 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim . . . [in order] to rebut evidence that 
the alleged victim was the first aggressor”). 
 150 Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1339. 
 151 Id. at 1342. 
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excessive-force claim and the police department’s liability.152  It also 
affirmed the inadmissibility of evidence pertaining to Palmquist’s 
suicidal motives with regard to the excessive-force claim.153  The court 
held that evidence of Palmquist’s death wish was inadmissible under the 
character-evidence rule.154  Moreover, it did not tend to make the 
existence of any fact material to “the objective reasonableness” test more 
or less probable, as this evidence came to light only after the shooting.155  
For these reasons, the court declined to upset the jury’s verdict.156 
However, the panel noted that the trial court had admitted much 
evidence bearing on Palmquist’s suicidal desires.157  Experts on both 
sides characterized the case as a suicide-by-cop situation, and the jury 
heard them characterize it as such.158  The appellate court held that the 
admission of additional evidence about suicide by cop would have been 
“cumulative” and “prejudicial.”159  Furthermore, even assuming that the 
additional evidence was improperly excluded, the error was harmless and 
therefore not a basis for overturning the verdict.160 
However, the court also declared that the suspect’s death wish was 
relevant to determining the validity of the damages award.161  The court 
held that completely excluding evidence bearing on Palmquist’s suicidal 
motives “could have had a highly prejudicial impact on the jury’s 
ultimate award to the plaintiff.”162  Palmquist’s suicidal statements to 
friends before the shooting reflected his life expectancy and were 
therefore relevant in calculating damages.163  However, because Selvik’s 
counsel did not fully present this argument on appeal, it was forfeited, 
and the appellate court could not rule on the matter.164  While the court 
strongly admonished Selvik’s attorneys for not exercising due diligence 
and raising this point at trial, it affirmed the trial court’s award of 
damages.165 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion suggests that either side 
 152 Id. at 1347. 
 153 Id. at 1340-41. 
 154 Id. at 1341. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 1347. 
 157 Id. at 1341. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 1342. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
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may introduce testimony about suicide by cop, if 1) it proves relevant to 
the question of damages, 2) the police were aware that the suspect was 
attempting suicide by goading officers into killing him or her, and 3) 
there is a dispute regarding the facts and the suspect’s suicidal motives 
have probative value in resolving that dispute.166  In Palmquist, the court 
cited another Seventh Circuit case, Sherrod v. Berry, which held that 
“knowledge of facts and circumstances gained after the fact . . . has no 
place in the . . . jury’s post-hoc analysis of the reasonableness of the 
actor’s judgment.  Were the rule otherwise, . . . the jury would possess 
more information than the officer possessed when he made the crucial 
decision.”167  The Palmquist court reiterated this rule by concluding that 
information that Sergeant Selvik did not possess at the time of the 
shooting, “such as Palmquist’s mental state and his physical behavior 
before the encounter,” was inadmissible.168  Such information would 
divert the jury’s focus from Palmquist’s actions to facts not immediately 
accessible to Selvik during his confrontation with the suspect—like 
Palmquist’s mental condition. 169 
However, the court qualified its general restriction on testimony 
concerning suicide by cop: such testimony is inadmissible only if it 
“occurred outside the presence of the police” and they “had no personal 
knowledge of it.”170  This qualification suggests that if police officers are 
aware of the suspect’s suicidal motives prior to the shooting, their 
awareness may be probative in determining whether the officers used 
excessive force.  The court stated that Officer Selvik “knew nothing of 
[Palmquist’s] preexisting condition and behavior” when he first 
encountered him.171  Consequently, these facts “could not have entered 
into Selvik’s determination on whether or not to shoot or how many 
times.”172  The court’s reasoning indicates that an officer’s personal 
knowledge can be probative when it goes to the issue of objective 
reasonableness.  In light of the officer’s knowledge at the time of the 
shooting, the court may consider whether his or her use of lethal force 
against a suspect who merely intended to commit suicide was objectively 
reasonable.  The officer’s personal knowledge is something a jury may 
take into account when assessing the reasonableness of a police response.  
For instance, the jury heard Palmquist’s statement to Selvik that the 
 166 Id. at 1341-42. 
 167 Id. at 1339 (quoting Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 168 Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1340. 
 169 Id. at 1340-41. 
 170 Id. at 1340. 
 171 Id. at 1341. 
 172 Id. 
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police would have to kill him, and also Palmquist’s last words that “this 
is what [he] wanted [the police] to do.”173  Thus, the jury’s determination 
that Selvik’s eleven gunshots amounted to excessive force may have 
been based in part on the jury’s consideration of these statements, despite 
the judge’s limiting instructions.174 
Other decisions also suggest that evidence of a suspect’s desire to 
commit suicide is admissible, as long as this evidence was known to the 
officer at the time of the shooting.  In Rascon v. Hardimen, another 
Seventh Circuit decision, officers severely beat a mentally impaired 
suspect.175  The trial judge refused to admit evidence of the suspect’s 
mental history, and on appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling.176  
The court held that the admission of such evidence might lead a jury to 
conclude that the suspect invited mistreatment at the hands of police 
officers.177  The jury could draw such a conclusion only on the basis of 
facts available at the time of the altercation.178  However, had the officer 
known of the suspect’s mental state before the severe beating, under 
Palmquist such knowledge might have been admissible as evidence in 
proving that the officer’s use of force was reasonable. 
Ironically, evidence that the suspect was attempting suicide may 
undermine a § 1983 claim if it appears that the suspect was inciting a 
lethal response through provocative or dangerous actions.  In a Ninth 
Circuit case, Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, a kidnapping 
suspect, Cammerin Boyd, repeatedly screamed at police officers to kill 
him.179  The officers asked Boyd to lie on the ground, and when he 
reached into his vehicle instead, the officers shot and killed him.180  
Boyd’s estate filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the county, and the county 
sought to introduce expert testimony that Boyd was attempting suicide 
by cop.181  The court held that such testimony was relevant to whether 
Boyd engaged in provocative actions against the police, and that “the 
suicide-by-cop theory” was “generally accepted in the relevant 
professional community” and therefore reliable.182  Consequently, it 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. (suggesting that the jury possibly considered the suspect’s suicidal intentions). 
 175 Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 176 Id. at 278. 
 177 Id. 
 178 See id. (holding that the exclusion of testimony regarding the suspect’s mental history was 
proper because such testimony might improperly suggest that “it would be reasonable to subdue him 
based on a supposed status rather than his conduct at the time [of the shooting]”). 
 179 Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 945-46. 
 182 Under the federal rules of evidence, in order for an expert’s testimony to be admissible at 
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upheld the district court’s decision to allow the county to introduce 
expert testimony on suicide by cop.183 
Boyd demonstrates that evidence of suicide by cop can be a double-
edged sword.  In some cases, it may be detrimental to a plaintiff’s 
excessive-force claim.  Often, a mentally ill suspect poses a threat to 
others even while attempting suicide.  The use of lethal force against 
such a suspect may be justified.  For instance, the suspect in Palmquist 
yelled at the officers trying to apprehend him that they were Viet Cong 
colonels.184  One could argue that he was suffering from hallucinations 
that made him dangerous to the police.  The lesson of Palmquist and the 
aforementioned cases is that evidence pertaining to a suspect’s suicidal 
motives may be relevant and admissible in a § 1983 lawsuit, and the jury 
may consider such evidence in deciding whether to impose liability on a 
police department.  If the evidence shows that the suspect posed a threat 
of harm only to himself or herself, the suspect’s death is likely to elicit 
sympathy from the jury, thereby allowing the plaintiff to prevail at trial. 
Other federal circuits have also prohibited the admission of pre-
seizure evidence in § 1983 suits.  For instance, in Dickerson v. 
McClellan, a Sixth Circuit case, police entered Joel Dickerson’s home 
without first knocking and announcing their presence.185  They heard 
Dickerson screaming the words, “I’ll get you motherfucker”186 but they 
did not know whom Dickerson was speaking to.  One of the officers saw 
a gun in Dickerson’s hand, and the officer fired four shots.187  Dickerson 
was killed, and his estate sued the police department for excessive 
force.188  An investigation revealed that Dickerson’s revolver was not 
cocked, and that he had not shot at any of the police officers.189  In fact, 
he had been on the phone with his girlfriend, and his threatening 
statement was directed at her.190 
The court limited its inquiry to circumstances of which the officer 
trial it must meet be based on reliable principles and methods that are applicable to the facts of the 
case. Id. at 945 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). 
 183 Boyd, 576 F.3d at 946. 
 184 Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1336 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 185 Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1996).  The knock-and-
announce rule is a common-law requirement that police officers seeking to enter a residential home 
must first knock on the door, announce their presence, and then wait a reasonable period before 
forcibly entering.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934-36 (1995).  Only exigent circumstances 
can justify an officer’s forced entry into a private home without first knocking and announcing his or 
her presence. Id. 
 186 Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1154. 
 187 Id. at 1155. 
 188 Id. at 1154. 
 189 Id. at 1155. 
 190 Id. 
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had knowledge at the time of the shooting.191  It “segmented” or 
distinguished the violation of the knock-and-announce rule (requiring 
police officers to announce their presence before entering someone’s 
home) from the excessive-force claim.192  Accordingly, in determining 
the validity of the plaintiff’s excessive-force claim, the court declined to 
consider the reasonableness of the officer’s actions prior to his “seizure” 
of the suspect.193  Even if an officer is responsible for creating the 
circumstances that necessitated the use of lethal force, a court should not 
consider the officer’s actions prior to his or her use of force.194  The 
prohibition against considering pre-seizure evidence applies to both the 
officer’s and the suspect’s conduct.  For example, a suicide note would 
constitute pre-seizure evidence of the suspect’s suicidal motives, and 
under Dickerson it may not be admissible—that is, of course, unless the 
officer read it prior to shooting the suspect.  If the officer reads the note 
before shooting the suspect, he or she would have knowledge of the 
suspect’s suicidal desire within the appropriate time frame, and evidence 
of that desire may then become admissible in determining whether the 
officer’s actions were reasonable. 
The Tenth Circuit has likewise held that a court should consider an 
officer’s conduct prior to the suspect’s threat of force only if the conduct 
is “immediately connected” to the threat.195  A suspect’s statement that 
he or she wishes to commit suicide may be the basis for finding that 
immediate connection, depending on when the officer hears the 
statement—if the officer hears the statement before he or she shoots the 
suspect, the statement may be admissible.  The Fourth Circuit has also 
adopted a narrow scope of the shooting time-frame, holding that 
questions like whether an officer showed his badge to a suspect or 
demanded that the suspect stop his car are irrelevant, because what 
matters is whether the officer had “reason to believe that [the suspect] 
posed a threat of death or serious bodily harm to him” at the moment of 
the shooting.196 
Other circuits have similarly restricted the admissibility of evidence 
 191 Id. at 1162-63. 
 192 Id. at 1160-63. 
 193 Id. at 1160-62. 
 194 See id. at 1161 (stating that in deciding a § 1983 case, a court must examine “whether the 
force used to effect that seizure was reasonable in the totality of the circumstances, not whether it 
was reasonable for the police to create the circumstances”) (quoting Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 
1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 195 Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 196 See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an officer’s failure to 
show his badge after stopping a suspect does not mean that the officer’s subsequent use of force was 
unconstitutional). 
23
Azizi: Suicide By Cop
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011
AZIZI (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  1:56:01 PM 
206 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
traint. 
 
in excessive-force cases.  In Wood v. City of Lakeland, an Eleventh 
Circuit case, officers entered the room of a “volatile, emotional and 
aggressive” teenager who was threatening to commit suicide.197  The 
teenager had not committed a crime.198  However, when officers entered 
the premises, they found the teenager bleeding on his dresser and holding 
a knife.199  When the teenager slid off the dresser, the officers shot 
him.200  The defense argued that the suspect had come at the officers 
with a knife.201  By contrast, the plaintiff argued that the teenager was 
lying prone on the floor when he was shot.202  Despite the factual 
dispute, the court sided with the defendants and concluded that knife-
wielding suspect could have endangered the officers, due to his 
aggravated emotional state and possession of a dangerous weapon.203  
The court declined to consider the suspect’s suicidal impulses of which 
the officers were aware, and whether in light of those impulses the police 
should have acted with greater res
Other courts have refused to hold the police liable for the death of a 
suicidal suspect.  For instance, in Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, the 
Tenth Circuit ruled against a suspect who sued under New Mexico state 
tort law and § 1983.204  The suspect, Berlinda Griego, held a gun to her 
head after she was pulled over by police officers and asked the officers to 
leave her alone so that she could kill herself.205  She refused several 
commands to drop her gun.206  After being blockaded by police cars, 
Griego turned her gun on the officers, who immediately shot and killed 
her.207  While the trial court ruled in favor of Griego’s estate on its § 
1983 claim, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court had 
applied the wrong standard of reasonableness.208  The police officers 
may have negligently placed themselves in harm’s way when they 
approached the suspect after she asked to be left alone, but their actions 
 197 Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288, 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on 
other grounds in  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 198 The suspect’s family called the police because he was trying to injure himself. Id. at 1290. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 1290-91. 
 201 Id. at 1290. 
 202 Id. at 1290-91. 
 203 Id. at 1293. 
 204 Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 
grounds by Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987). 
 205 Id. at 712. 
 206 Id. at 713. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 716-17. 
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did not give rise to a colorable excessive-force claim under Graham.209  
Quezada illustrates two points: that a suspect’s suicidal motives may not 
provide significant evidentiary support for a plaintiff’s arguments, and 
that a finding of negligence under state tort law does not by itself support 
a § 1983 clai
Another decision, Plakas v. Drinski, reinforces the difficulty of 
raising suicide by cop as a theory for recovery under § 1983.210  In 
Plakas, the Seventh Circuit held that police officers have no 
constitutional duty to employ nonlethal means in subduing a dangerous 
suspect, even if the suspect is attempting suicide-by-cop.211  The court 
stressed the importance of evaluating objective signs that the suspect 
poses a danger to police officers, rather than evaluating the suspect’s 
subjective intent.212  For example, if a suspect points a gun at a police 
officer, a lethal response by the officer would be appropriate even if 
evidence later shows that the suspect did not intend to kill the officer.213 
Thus, while courts following Palmquist may accept evidence of a 
suspect’s suicidal desires in determining whether a police response was 
unreasonable or excessive, courts outside the Seventh Circuit seem 
reticent in considering such evidence.  The Tenth, Eleventh, and Seventh 
Circuits have indicated that even if the suspect is suicidal, as long as he 
or she possesses a weapon and makes provocative gestures, the police are 
entitled to use lethal force.  Nevertheless, the Palmquist verdict suggests 
that, despite the more academic holding of the appellate opinion, the jury 
took the victim’s statements—that he wanted the police to shoot him—
into consideration when deciding whether to hold the police liable.  
Because other circuits may decide to follow Palmquist, police 
 209 Id.  The Tenth Circuit stressed that the standard of reasonableness in negligence cases is 
broader than the reasonableness standard applied under § 1983 and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 
(1989).  Under an ordinary negligence standard, the trier of fact may consider whether officers acted 
unreasonably before engaging the suspect.  However, the reasonableness inquiry under § 1983 is far 
more time-specific: only the circumstances immediately preceding the shooting can be assessed in 
determining whether officers violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.  In Quezada, although 
the court did not find that the police officer had violated Griego’s constitutional rights, it found that 
he had breached the duty of care he owed to Griego. Id. at 722.  He breached this duty because he 
“amplified the risk of harm to Ms. Griego” when he approached her vehicle.  Accordingly, the court 
found that he had acted negligently but not with excessive force. Id. 
 210 Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 211 Id. 
 212 The court declared that “[s]hooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to 
use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of 
self-defense even if, as Plakas’s expert maintains, the man is attempting ‘suicide by police.’”  Id. at 
1146. 
 213 The court rejected the proposition that it should “return to the prior segments of the event 
and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct.” Id. at 1150. 
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departments should consider the liability they may face if they fail to 
train officers in properly identifying and engaging with suspects who 
may be attempting suicide by cop. 
IV. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADDRESSING SUICIDE BY COP AS A 
 SERIOUS PROBLEM WITHIN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY 
A blanket refusal to scrutinize police tactics in suicide-by-cop 
incidents may “invite reckless and irresponsible police behavior.”214  On 
the one hand, holding an officer liable for shooting a suspect with a gun 
may impair the ability of police departments to protect the public.  On 
the other hand, police departments cannot ignore the possibility that 
some suspects commit provocative acts for the purpose of inviting a 
lethal response.  Devising a way to reduce suicide-by-cop incidents 
without hindering police responsiveness proves difficult, especially when 
only 22% of suicide-by-cop attempts involve an empty gun or some 
other nonlethal prop.215  Most other attempts involve lethal force directed 
at the officer.216 
Moreover, requiring a police officer to assess the psychological 
condition of a suspect, in addition to any number of other split-second 
judgments the officer is required to make under life-threatening 
circumstances might not be fair.  Requiring officers to use more lenient 
tactics in subduing suicidal suspects might encourage non-suicidal 
suspects to feign suicide in order to accomplish their criminal ends.  In 
light of the relationship between homicidal and suicidal tendencies, these 
“criminal ends” often involve the intent to kill or harm others;217 the 
Columbine shooters exemplify this trend.218  Preserving the life of an 
individual who attempts suicide becomes less of a priority if he or she 
poses a threat to innocent civilians. 
Nevertheless, police departments should do all they can to restrain 
officers in the use of lethal force.  Few would criticize the police officer 
in Plakas for subduing a suspect who came at the officer with a sharp 
metal object by shooting him, because that suspect posed a danger to the 
 214 Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: 
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 577 (2000). 
 215 Id. at 578. 
 216 Id. 
 217 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 13 (2004). 
 218 James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth 
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2000). 
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officer.219  However, a suspect like the one in Wood – the teenager who 
was attempting suicide – may elicit more sympathy from a jury.220  The 
officer in Wood could have subdued the suspect with a taser, as the 
suspect had not yet charged at the police officers.221  In fact, he fell to the 
floor before he was shot.222  Had the officers understood the nature of the 
suspect’s acts and that he only intended to harm himself, tragedy might 
have been averted.  Consequently, police departments should take 
reasonable steps to prevent suicide by cop.  In order to improve their 
tactical response to suicide by cop, law enforcement agencies should take 
the following steps: 1) implement a procedure for tracking the frequency 
of suicide-by-cop incidents, and 2) better educate officers on to use 
nonlethal methods to resolve suicide-by-cop attempts. 
A. IMPLEMENTING A UNIFORM METHOD FOR REPORTING SUICIDE BY 
 COP 
The absence of national statistics on suicide by cop hinders law 
enforcement agencies in fully addressing the problem.  Without 
comprehensive studies, police departments cannot incorporate a 
procedure to address suicide by cop into their tactical training programs.  
One proposed solution is to collect several hundred incidents from 
around the country and determine the common characteristics that 
victims involved in these incidents share, so as to convey a “sense of the 
‘typical’ suicide-by-cop incident.”223  With this information, law 
enforcement officers would be better equipped to recognize and 
formulate appropriate responses to suicide-by-cop incidents. 
A study by the FBI, published in 2005, advocates the use of a two-
tiered system in evaluating attempts at suicide by cop.224  First, after the 
event occurs, the officer present at the scene makes the initial 
 219 In Plakas, the suspect assailed the police officer with a fireplace poker. Plakas v. Drinski, 
19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 220 In Wood, the suspect had cut himself repeatedly with a knife before the police arrived, 
indicating that he likely meant to harm only himself. Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288, 
1290 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).  The 
autopsy report also indicated that the suspect had not raised his hand in a threatening gesture toward 
the cops. Id. at 1290-91.  The officers shot him when he slid off the dresser on which he was sitting. 
Id. at 1293. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 109 (2004). 
 224 Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a 
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf. 
27
Azizi: Suicide By Cop
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011
AZIZI (FORMATTED).DOC 4/23/2011  1:56:01 PM 
210 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
determination that the suspect’s use of deadly force was motivated by 
suicide.225  Second, an officer with expertise in handling deadly-force 
incidents makes a final determination after a complete investigation as to 
whether the initial officer’s determination was correct.226  Circumstances 
that will support these determinations include “statements made by the 
offender . . . ; [the] type of weapon possessed by the offender; . . . 
conduct that the officer deemed bizarre or inappropriate on the part of the 
offender; and circumstances indicating that the offender’s motivation 
may have been suicide.”227  Obviously, in some cases the offender’s 
motivation may not be apparent even after a full investigation.  
Nevertheless, this approach will enable law enforcement agencies to 
measure the frequency of suicide by cop more effectively. 
B. HOW OFFICERS CAN SUBDUE ATTEMPTS AT SUICIDE BY COP 
 WITHOUT RESORTING TO DEADLY FORCE 
There are a number of nonlethal methods for restraining a suicidal 
suspect.  One such method is “tactical withdrawal”: once an officer 
determines that an individual is suicidal, the officer can create greater 
physical distance between him or herself and the individual.228  Physical 
distance will mitigate the threat posed to police officers and give officers 
more time to formulate a plan of action to calm and neutralize the 
suicidal individual.229  Some commentators suggest that a suicidal 
individual can be left alone as long as it is “in an area . . . where no one 
else is at risk.”230  Through withdrawal, police officers can at least make 
it difficult for the suspect to commit suicide. 
The police can also deal with suspects wielding weapons other than 
firearms or bombs by using nonlethal force.231  A knife-wielding suspect, 
like the suspect in Wood, can sometimes be disarmed using shotgun-
projected bean bags or rubber bullets.232  A sharpshooter can keep a 
target on the perpetrator, in case he or she runs at an officer with a 
dangerous object. 233  Likewise, a taser can be employed against a 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY 
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 110 (2004). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
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suspect who is not holding a firea
 Police departments should instruct officers to employ these 
nonlethal methods only when they can reasonably ascertain that a suspect 
poses no risk of deadly harm to others.  Once they receive rigorous 
training on the characteristics that suicidal suspects share, police officers 
can more readily recognize a genuine attempt at suicide by cop and 
handle the situation accordingly.  This sort of training will enhance the 
quality of police work and aid social workers and psychologists in 
treating suicidal and emotionally disturbed individuals before they meet 
a tragic end. 
CONCLUSION 
The lack of comprehensive legal literature on suicide by cop 
perpetuates the belief that nothing can be done by law enforcement 
agencies to ameliorate this primarily sociological problem.  Perhaps the 
scarcity of such literature reflects a belief that unless something poses a 
tangible threat of litigation, it need not be addressed as a serious concern.  
However, suicide-by-cop incidents often lead to lawsuits.  Moreover, 
evidence of a suspect’s suicidal desires may negate the reasonableness of 
a lethal police response under § 1983, thereby empowering plaintiffs in 
Fourth Amendment suits. 
Strong policy reasons exist for distinguishing police-assisted suicide 
from assault or homicide incidents.  Law enforcement agencies should 
recall the original impetus behind the enactment of the 1871 Civil Rights 
Act: protecting African-Americans from abuse and discrimination at the 
hands of the state.  As discussed earlier, those who commit suicide by 
cop tend to be destitute and to suffer from substance abuse or mental 
illness.  Suicide by cop is a byproduct of cumulative factors prevalent in 
lower-income communities.  When the police kill individuals desperate 
enough to attempt suicide, they remain apathetic to discriminatory state 
policies that exacerbate such factors.  Police tactics take on a 
discriminatory hue, thereby undermining the very spirit of § 1983.  Thus, 
police officers should do their best to defuse suicide-by-cop incidents 
through nonlethal force.  If police departments can adopt this approach, 
they would set a powerful example for the rest of society to follow in 
redressing the ills that § 1983 was designed to combat. 
 
 234 Id. at 111. 
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